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Abstract In the near future developments in non-invasive
prenatal testing (NIPT) may soon provide couples with the
opportunity to test for and diagnose a much broader range
of heritable and congenital conditions than has previously
been possible. Inevitably, this has prompted much ethical
debate on the possible implications of NIPT for providing
couples with opportunities for reproductive choice by way
of routine prenatal screening. In view of the possibility to
test for a significantly broader range of genetic conditions
with NIPT, the European Society of Human Genetics
(ESHG) and American Society of Human Genetics
(ASHG) recommend that, pending further debate, prenatal
screening for reproductive choice should only be offered
where concerning serious congenital conditions and
childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation,
the ESHG and ASHG discuss a number of ethical issues on
which they prompt further debate: the informational pri-
vacy of the future child, the trivialization of abortion, the
risk of information overload, and issues of distributive
justice. This paper responds to this call with further
reflection on each ethical issue and how it relates to the
moral justification of providing couples with opportunities
for meaningful reproductive choice. The paper concludes
that whilst there may be good reasons for qualifying the
scope of any unsolicited prenatal screening offer to serious
congenital conditions and childhood disorders, if prenatal
screening is justified for providing couples with
opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice, then
health services may have obligations to empower couples
with the same opportunity where concerning other
conditions.
Keywords Abortion  Ethics  Non-invasive prenatal
testing  Prenatal screening  Reproductive autonomy 
Reproductive choice
Introduction
Many health services provide some type of prenatal
screening service that is routinely offered to women and
their partners during antenatal care. Although there is much
plurality in policy and practice between countries, it is
common that a minimum set of screening options are
provided. Typically, these include screening options for
infectious diseases such as HIV, Syphilis, and Hepatitis B.
They also include screening options for clinical conditions,
namely rhesus D incompatibility, gestational diabetes, and
pre-eclampsia. In these cases, screening is offered for the
purpose of improving clinical outcomes for both the
mother and the future child through the early detection of
disease and timely provision of preventative treatment or
therapy (HCN 2008; NICE 2008). Accordingly, participa-
tion in screening is often presented as a matter of course by
the clinician. Yet, many health services offer an additional
set of screening options where this would be inappropriate.
These latter screening options address heritable and con-
genital conditions for which preventative treatment or
therapy has limited effect or is unavailable altogether. This
usually includes the following conditions: the trisomies
Down syndrome (T21), Edward syndrome (T18), and Patau
syndrome (T13); the hemoglobinopathies sickle cell
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disease and thalassemia; as well as structural anomalies
including neural tube defects such as anencephaly and
spina bifida (Godard et al. 2003a, b; HCN 2008; NICE
2008). When screening is offered for these conditions
international guidelines recommend that it should instead
be aimed at providing couples with opportunities for
reproductive choice of whether or not to have a child with a
serious medical disorder (NCB 1993, 2006; HCN 2008).
Up until recently, the range of heritable and congenital
conditions for which prenatal screening could be offered
remained somewhat limited. However, this is set to change
significantly with the prospect that genome wide fetal
profiling may soon be possible with Non-invasive Prenatal
Testing (NIPT) (Wong and Dennis Lo 2016). Couples may
then use NIPT to test for, diagnose, and make reproductive
choices about a much broader range of (genetic) condi-
tions. Not only might this be achievable much earlier
during pregnancy than is presently possible but it may
furthermore allow couples to circumvent the risk of iatro-
genic miscarriage associated with using invasive diagnostic
techniques amniocentesis or chorionic villi sampling, upon
which current prenatal screening pathways are reliant
(Alfirevic et al. 2003; de Jong et al. 2011; Tabor and
Alfirevic 2010; Wong and Dennis Lo 2016).
In view of these developments, the European Society of
Human Genetics (ESHG) and American Society of Human
Genetics (ASHG) recommend that, pending further debate,
prenatal screening should only be offered for reproductive
choice where concerning serious congenital and herita-
ble disorders that affect childhood (Dondorp et al. 2015). In
support of this tentative recommendation, the ESHG and
ASHG raise a number of ethical issues on which they
prompt further debate: the informational privacy of the
future child, the trivialization of abortion, the risk of
information overload, and issues of distributive justice.
This paper aims to respond to this call with further
reflection on each ethical issue and how it relates to the
moral justification of providing couples with opportunities
for meaningful reproductive choice. The paper is primarily
concerned with whether or not the structural directivity of
the proposed scope for prenatal screening is justified in
view of the aim of providing couples with opportunities for
meaningful reproductive choice; conceptualized within this
paper as informed and autonomous reproductive choices of
whether or not to continue pregnancy, that enable couples
to avoid suffering they anticipate for themselves and/or
their future child (NCB 1993, 2006; de Jong and de Wert
2015; HCN 2008). The following research questions are
explored: what is the principle moral justification for pro-
viding couples with the opportunity for reproductive choice
in the format of routine prenatal screening, where con-
cerning fetal anomalies such as Down syndrome and neural
tube defects? How might the justification apply to other
conditions for which NIPT could soon be available? Is this
consistent with the tentative recommendations presented
within the joint ESHG and ASHG position paper on NIPT?
Prenatal screening for fetal anomalies
For most forms of screening, participants benefit from the
early detection of disease and timely provision of preven-
tative treatment or therapy. However, this may not always
be the case where concerning screening for fetal anomalies
such as Down syndrome and neural tube defects. For these
conditions preventative treatment or therapy may have only
a limited effect or is perhaps unavailable altogether. As a
consequence, couples may receive few practical courses of
action other than to decide whether or not to terminate the
pregnancy. This has prompted considerable debate over
why prenatal screening for conditions that are generally not
preventable might be offered in the first place (Clarke
1997; de Jong and de Wert 2015; Juth and Munthe 2012;
Munthe 2015; van El et al. 2012; Wilkinson 2015). In
relation to this question, several justifications are readily
discussed within ethical debate. Generally speaking, these
correspond to one of two conflicting frameworks: (1) where
preferred reproductive choices may be promoted by the
health service provider (a directive framework) and (2)
where preferred reproductive choices should not be pro-
moted by the health service provider (a non-directive
framework). In the following section, justifications asso-
ciated with either framework will be discussed.
The directive framework
During the early development of prenatal screening pro-
grammes that targeted fetal anomalies, prenatal screening
was routinely offered for objectives that implied that cou-
ples should participate in order to avoid the birth of an
affected child (Centerwall 1970; Navon and Padeh 1971;
Stein 1975; Stein and Susser 1971). This directive
approach has been justified for three principle reasons.
First, selectively aborting fetuses with conditions for which
prenatal and perinatal prevention is generally not possible
could help to avoid suffering for the future child (Clarke
1997; Green 1997). The emphasis of this appeal is on
preventing future persons from having to endure particu-
larly severe physical and psychological suffering that
might be associated with some heritable or congenital
disorders. Clarkeburn (2000) argues that parents who are
aware they are at risk may have moral (non-legal) obliga-
tions to participate in prenatal screening where concerning
severe health conditions for which many might consider
life not worth living. Clarkeburn suggests that only for
conditions characterized by significant levels of intellectual
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disability and continuous non-palliative pain would it be
reasonable to believe that non-existence is in the best
interests of the future child (2000).
The appeal to ‘avoid suffering’ is also used in another
justification for offering prenatal screening. However,
within this second justification, the concept of suffering
does not relate to the wellbeing of the future child, but
instead, concerns the psychosocial health of prospective
parents and their family. The main concern relates to the
anguish and grief that a couple may experience as parents
of a child whose suffering cannot be prevented (Clarke
1997). However, unlike the previous appeal to avoid the
suffering of the future child within this latter justification
women have no moral obligations to consider screening.
The offer may instead be viewed as a form of paternalism.
This justification is often cited in support of offering
screening for conditions that might qualify as a life not
worth living. However, it may theoretically be applied to
any condition where it is reasonable to expect significant
levels of distress may be experienced by prospective par-
ents. For example, the principle is also relevant in cases
where couples (and their families) may primarily feel
burdened by obligations towards providing care and sup-
port for their child, rather than, by the child’s suffering
(Faden et al. 1987; Lippman 1991).
The third justification for offering screening for repro-
ductive choice is that this may lessen the overall burden of
disease on society (Clarke 1997; Juth and Munthe 2012;
Stein 1975; Stein and Susser 1971; Wilkinson 2015).
Unlike the personal appeals to avoid suffering, justifica-
tions based on the social utility of women’s reproductive
choices are highly impersonal and only indirectly con-
cerned with the wellbeing of each couple and their future
child. The primary concern is that screening is organized in
a way that maximizes its benefit to society (Wilkinson
2015). An extreme application of this principle can be seen
within some economic evaluations of prenatal screening
programmes. For example, in a critical review of the eco-
nomic appraisal literature, Mooney and Lange (1993) raise
concern about the use of models that derive benefit from
women electing to terminate an affected pregnancy (i.e. it
is assumed there is no benefit from screening if women do
not abort affected fetuses). Such models differ in their
assessment of the women’s utility based on the condition
for which screening is offered and the number of ‘healthy’
replacement pregnancies occurring after an abortion (e.g. 0,
1, or 1\X). Mooney and Lange point out that within these
models (1993): ‘‘[benefits] take the form of various savings
in public expenditure (e.g. health services), in family
expenditure on the child, in avoided lost maternal output
and the child’s consumption of other goods and services’’
(1993, p. 874). Accordingly, greater levels of directivity
may be preferred when offering screening for conditions
which require more expensive medical care and social
support.
Counter perspectives
Objections to offering prenatal screening for fetal anoma-
lies generally focus on the disproportionality of benefits
and harms received by different stakeholders when pre-
ferred reproductive choices are promoted by the health
service provider. These objections are associated with fetal
rights, feminist, and disability rights perspectives (de Jong
and de Wert 2015; Johnsen 1986; Parens and Asch 2003;
Wertz and Fletcher 1993). From the fetal rights perspec-
tives, the life of the unborn fetus is considered sacred.
Abortion is therefore inherently wrong. Since prenatal
screening ‘for reproductive choice’ provides couples with
an ‘opportunity’ for an abortion, health services are thought
to be complicit in this wrong. Whilst this applies to the
provision of any opportunities for reproductive choice,
when the opportunity is presented in a way that promotes
the use of abortion (e.g. such as within an unsolicited
screening offer as opposed to following personal enquiry)
health services hold a higher level of responsibility for
wrong doing. Screening for reproductive choice is there-
fore less objectionable when it does not influence the
autonomy of couples’ reproductive decisions. From the
most extreme fetal rights perspective, the fetus has a moral
status equivalent to that of any adult person. Accordingly,
abortion is generally viewed as the moral equivalent of
murder. Screening for reproductive choice would therefore
be highly problematic in all but a few very rare cases where
either the life of the expectant mother is threatened or the
life of the fetus would not be considered worth living
(Clarkeburn 2000). Although this position is sometimes
dismissed as religious dogma, it has been argued by
appealing to the similarity of both developmental origins
and potential futures jointly shared by the fetus and adult
person (Gill 2005; Marquis 1989). In contrast, more
moderate perspectives assign a lower moral status to the
fetus based on growing biological and psychological sim-
ilarities between the fetus, newborn, and adult. From this
less radical perspective, the moral status of the fetus
gradually increases throughout its development. Yet,
greater emphasis is placed on later stages of pregnancy
(Gillespie 1977; Steinbock 2011). Whilst abortion is still
considered to be a controversy option, a considerably more
lenient view is taken on when it might be acceptable, and
therefore, when prenatal screening for reproductive choice
might also be acceptable.
The disability rights perspective is primarily concerned
with the issue of bias (Kaposy 2013; Reinders 2000). More
specifically, why screening for reproductive choice might
be offered for some conditions but not for others? In the
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context of prenatal screening for Down syndrome, some
families affected by Down syndrome have argued that the
condition does not prevent them from leading worthwhile
and fulfilling lives. It has been suggested that the most
significant source of suffering for many affected families is
stigma, discrimination, and the general lack of inclusive-
ness within society (Brasington 2007; Cunningham 1996).
In cases where suffering may be avoided through social
interventions, offering screening for reproductive choice
would not appear to be about serving the needs of the
future child and/or prospective parents, but rather, about
lessening the burden of disease on ‘the rest’ of society. If
screening for reproductive choice is offered for this reason,
it conveys a discriminatory message about people living
with the condition (Holm 2008; Parens and Asch 2003).
For example, in their article on the preventability of Down
syndrome, Stein and Susser suggest that prenatal diagnostic
testing should be offered to older pregnant women as one
of four preventative measures to reduce the incidence of
Down syndrome among new born populations. In support
of this position, they problematize the increasing longevity
of people living with Down syndrome, stating that ‘‘But
whatever is done, the survivors continue in a state of
permanent dependence that imposes a severe burden on
their families and on existing forms of social organiza-
tion.’’ (Stein and Susser 1971, p. 650). They clarify ‘‘The
goal of public health in such a situation must be preven-
tion, and preferably primary prevention, that is, the
reduction of the incidence of the disorder by action taken
before it becomes manifest.’’ (p. 651). Whilst it may be
unintended, these statements convey a discriminatory
message: ‘people’ with Down syndrome are a burden on
‘the rest’ of society, and therefore, unwelcome. However,
prejudice may not always be conveyed overtly. Offering
screening for reproductive choice may still be problematic
if health services are organized inequitably. This might
apply to screening that is offered in the context of dimin-
ishing investment in care and support for affected families,
or alternatively, if access to abortion services is condi-
tionally linked to a diagnosis of disability.
From a feminist perspective, any offer of prenatal
screening for reproductive choice where preferred repro-
ductive choices are recommended by the health service
provider may threaten women’s reproductive rights and
freedoms (Johnsen 1986). Reproductive decision making,
especially when concerning abortion, should remain a
voluntary and highly personal practice that reflects the
biological role that women play during reproduction and
takes into account the way that women experience preg-
nancy (Dondorp et al. 2015; Lippman 1991; HCN 2008;
Rothman 1986; Wertz and Fletcher 1993). Any suggestion
that women should participate in screening in order to
avoid the birth of an affected child might pressure women
into distressing and emotionally burdensome decisions
which they may later come to regret. Such pressure might
not only be the result of an explicit recommendation. It is
also possible that health policy contributes to a coercive
social context for making reproductive choices. For
example, providing access to abortion services only in
cases of disability or reducing investment in care and
support for affected families may lead to social pressures
towards making certain reproductive choices and not oth-
ers. However, the feminist position is not categorically
opposed to the offer of screening for reproductive choice.
Instead it is suggested that many women positively value
the opportunity that an offer of prenatal screening provides
(Lippman 1991; van Schendel et al. 2014; Wertz and
Fletcher 1993).
The non-directive framework
In view of these objections, international guidelines now
recommend that screening for reproductive choice should
only be offered within a framework of non-directivity. If
screening for reproductive choice is offered within a non-
directive framework it would seem much harder to claim
that health services convey a discriminatory message about
individuals with disabilities or promote the subjugation of
women’s reproductive autonomy. This position is endorsed
within guidelines for responsible screening published by
health authorities in the UK, the Netherlands, and within
many other Western countries (de Jong et al. 2011; Godard
et al. 2003a, b; HCN 2008). The two most characteristic
features of this framework are that health services should
adopt a position of neutrality with respect to the outcomes
of couples’ reproductive choices (i.e. there are no preferred
pre- or post-test choices) and should support couples in
making informed and autonomous reproductive choices in
line with their own values of whether or not to have an
affected child (HCN 2008). For example, in the report
‘Screening: Between hope and hype’, commissioned by the
Health council of the Netherlands, it is argued that
although screening may not always benefit participants in
terms of improved health outcomes, participants may still
derive some (personal) utility through the provision of
reliable information upon which an informed and autono-
mous reproductive choice can be made (2008). This con-
cept of utility differs from that adopted within the directive
framework which is mainly focused on the utility of
reproductive outcomes. The directive framework is broadly
based on normative criteria first articulated by Wilson and
Junger in 1968, before prenatal testing for fetal anomalies
was widely available (Andermann et al. 2008; Wilson and
Jungner 1968). Wilson and Junger endorse the use of a
conservative concept of utility that is primarily about
preventing disease through early detection and timely
G. Stapleton
123
provision of treatment or therapy. Screening programmes
with this aim are typically assessed in terms of the overall
reduction in mortality, morbidity, and quality of life. In
contrast, the concept of utility applied within the non-di-
rective framework is about providing couples with oppor-
tunities for meaningful reproductive choice; generally
understood as informed and autonomous reproductive
choices of whether or not to continue with pregnancy, that
enable couples to avoid suffering they anticipate for
themselves and/or their future child (de Jong et al. 2011;
Dondorp et al. 2010; Wilfond and Thomson 2000).
Ethical challenges
As argued by de Jong and de Wert, moral objections to
offering prenatal screening are weaker when it is the couple
and not the state that decides whether or not to avoid the
birth of an affected child (2015). To ensure that health
services remain impartial with respect to couples’ (pre- and
post-test) reproductive choices whilst also supporting them
in making meaningful reproductive choices, international
guidelines recommend that several criteria should be met.
First, health services should make it clear to couples that
prenatal screening is offered in order to provide them with
an opportunity for making meaningful reproductive choi-
ces about whether or not to continue with an affected
pregnancy and that they may freely decide to accept or
decline the offer. This recommendation applies most crit-
ically to communications between the physician and the
expectant couple. However, it is also intended to apply to
policy, educational materials, and other documentation in
which the purpose of screening may be addressed. The
main ethical concerns are that women and their partners are
fully informed of the aim of screening, that they may be
confronted with challenging information, and that they
understand that they are free to make their own reproduc-
tive choices. Second, additional services that actively
support couples in making meaningful reproductive choices
should also be provided. In this respect, health services
should ensure the quality of screening options offered,
provide non-directive pre- and post-test counseling, pro-
vide educational support, and maintain equitable access to
follow-up services (e.g. services for abortion and services
that provide care and support to affected families) (NCB
1993, 2006; HCN 2008; PCEPBR 1983).
Although there is broad consensus that where prenatal
screening for reproductive choice is offered it should be
offered within a non-directive framework, at present there
remains much debate as to whether principles of non-di-
rectivity should also be applied to the scope of prenatal
screening. With respect to this issue, ethical debate on the
offer of prenatal screening appears polarized between
providing couples with ‘pure choice’ and ‘qualified choice’
in what to screen for (de Jong and de Wert 2015; Munthe
2015; Wilkinson 2015). For proponents of pure choice,
non-directivity is applied in its most absolute sense. The
structural directivity of an unsolicited, yet, qualified pre-
natal screening offer ‘for the purpose of reproductive
choice’ is therefore problematic (for reasons conveyed by
fetal rights, feminist, and disability rights perspectives). In
contrast, for proponents of qualified choice, the structural
directivity of a qualified offer is justifiable as long as
couples are still able to make meaningful reproductive
choices about whether or not to have an affected child. As a
result, some variant of the non-directive framework is used
to determine which screening options should be offered. In
relation to this issue, the ESHG and ASHG discuss several
ethical issues in support of offering prenatal screening only
where concerning serious congenital and childhood disor-
ders: the informational privacy of the future child, the
trivialization of abortion, the risk of information overload,
and issues of distributive justice (Dondorp et al. 2015).
These ethical issues will now be discussed within the fol-
lowing commentary where justifications for qualified
choice will be examined with respect to the principle jus-
tification for offering prenatal screening; to provide cou-
ples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice.
The informational privacy of the future child
The idea of limiting the scope of screening in order to
protect the informational privacy of the future child relates
to the concern that children may (later on) learn of personal
health information that was attained by their parents during
prenatal screening. The main ethical issue is that children
may experience psychosocial distress from foreknowledge
that they may later develop a disorder for which (primary)
prevention is unavailable. The breach of informational
privacy is sometimes discussed in terms of a violation of
the child’s right to an open future (i.e. to choose for
themselves whether to know about the condition) (Andorno
2004; BSHG 2010; Wright 2009). Although this concern is
primarily associated with screening for adult onset condi-
tions, it is also relevant for sub-clinical conditions that
might go undiagnosed during childhood but the label of
which may still cause some psychosocial harm or impinge
upon a person’s right to informational privacy (Dondorp
et al. 2015).
Whilst the idea of protecting the future child from
psychosocial and informational harm has strong moral
appeal, it is not fully apparent how it should be taken into
account in view of the aim of offering prenatal screening.
For example, why might any appeal to protect the infor-
mational privacy of a (possible) future child represent a
more convincing objection to couples’ having the
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opportunity to make meaningful reproductive choices
about adult onset conditions and sub-clinical conditions,
than the appeal to protect the presumed interests of the
(existing) fetus in becoming that future child? If providing
couples with the opportunity for meaningful reproductive
choice through routine prenatal screening is justifiable for
any condition where the life of the (possible) future child
does not qualify as a life not worth living, health services
must presumably adopt one of the following assumptions:
either the fetus has no ‘interests’ to be considered, which
will include any future privacy interests, or alternatively,
the interests of the fetus are conditional on couples’
meaningful reproductive choices, in which case, health
services will have a pro tanto reason to discount them
when offering prenatal screening. Certainly there is a
conditional risk associated with participating in prenatal
screening for adult onset conditions and sub-clinical con-
ditions; a risk that is entirely contingent on couples electing
not to terminate an affected pregnancy following prenatal
screening. This represents a challenging ethical issue.
Since any risk to the future child will be conditional on
couples’ reproductive choices, not offering prenatal
screening to protect (possible) future children may imply
that health services are not aiming to provide couples with
opportunities for reproductive choices that are meaningful
to them for avoiding suffering.
In view of the conditionality of the risk to the future
child, some directivity with respect to the safe use of
prenatal screening for adult onset conditions and sub-
clinical conditions would seem justifiable in order to dis-
courage couples from participating, for example, if they do
not intend to avoid the birth of an affected child (Bunnik
et al. 2013). For these conditions, the aim of prenatal
screening should be more about ensuring that couples have
the opportunity to make a meaningful pre-test reproductive
choice that takes into account the seriousness of any con-
ditional risk to the future child. It would therefore seem
appropriate that these screening options are not offered
within the same normative framework used to offer other
prenatal screening options that do not carry a conditional
risk to the future child. When considering this issue, it
could be justifiable to refrain from making an unsolicited
offer of screening for adult onset and sub-clinical condi-
tions during routine antenatal care. Yet, if health services
genuinely aim to provide couples with the opportunity to
make meaningful reproductive choices, then health ser-
vices may have obligations to ensure that couples are
similarly empowered where concerning adult onset and
sub-clinical conditions. One way in which this might be
achieved would be to only offer such opportunities fol-
lowing personal enquiry. In this respect, the offer would no
longer be unsolicited yet couples that anticipate suffering
for themselves and/or their future child may still be
provided with an opportunity for making a meaningful
reproductive choice about adult onset and sub-clinical
conditions. If such an approach would be adopted, it would
seem advisable to ensure that couples’ have sufficient
capabilities to anticipate suffering for themselves and/or
their future child where concerning adult onset and sub-
clinical conditions. A practical solution to this issue would
be to develop strategies that engage couples prior to con-
ception in order to more effectively educate and counsel
them on their opportunities in preparation for pregnancy.
Information overload
Although there are different interpretations of what infor-
mation should be provided in order to attain informed
consent, there is general agreement that health services
should present couples with relevant information about (1)
the characteristics of any condition for which screening is
offered, (2) the characteristics of any screening tests that
are offered, and (3) the implications of any test results that
may follow (van den Berg et al. 2005). Accordingly, as the
scope of screening expands the amount of information that
each couple must process is likely to increase. The central
ethical issue here is the risk of uninformed reproductive
choice. Couples who become confused, distressed, or
overwhelmed by the level or complexity of post-test
information provided may be unable to make choices that
are consistent with their own values. However, information
overload is also an important pre-test concern during the
offer of screening, where there is an additional risk that
couples may simply become burdened by the level of
choice on offer (Bunnik et al. 2013). Couples that experi-
ence this issue may be unable to fully understand the
implications of their pre-test choices and the risks associ-
ated with participating in screening.
Given that the risk of information overload is likely to
be exacerbated if more numerous kinds of conditions with
dissimilar implications are included within the scope of
screening, there is a strong moral imperative to prioritize
conditions to be included within the scope of prenatal
screening. Yet, at the same time, limiting the scope of
screening in order to reduce the risk of informational
overload may also increase its structural directivity. This
places significant moral importance on what criterion
might be used to include or exclude a condition from the
scope of screening and why. In relation to this issue, it
would not be appropriate to ‘rank’ conditions according to
the utility that avoiding the birth of an affected child may
have for couples (Mooney and Lange 1993). Although this
may be intuitive, assuming a priori which reproductive
outcomes would avert most suffering conflicts with the
principle aim of providing couples with opportunities for
meaningful reproductive choice. In line with principles of
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non-directivity, health services should not convey the
message that terminating an affected pregnancy will benefit
either the prospective parents or future child in terms of
avoiding suffering. Although this would be considered
least problematic where concerning conditions that qualify
as a life not worth living, the issue remains that couples
should have discretion to make such value judgements for
themselves. The principle concern here is that the ‘seri-
ousness’ of each reproductive outcome for avoiding suf-
fering should be determined by each couple in view of their
own personal situation and not assumed by the health
service on behalf of all couples.
Yet, it would seem unproblematic to assess screening
options according to couples’ informational needs where
concerning the implications of each reproductive outcome
for the future child and for themselves (Pergament and
Pergament 2012). For example, screening for conditions
that are characterized by more severe levels of intellectual
disability and greater levels of continuous non-palliative
pain may provide couples with a strong indicator of the
quality of life of the future child, and thus, be more
informative. Screening for conditions where there are more
significant obligations for parents, in terms of the provision
of care and support, may also be more useful. Whereas,
screening for conditions where quality of life of the future
child is more significantly determined by individually
affecting social factors may be least useful to couples.
Since most couples will be familiar with such factors
before the offer of prenatal screening they may already
have sufficient capabilities to make meaningful reproduc-
tive choices about them. Therefore, an unsolicited screen-
ing offer may provide them with little added value over and
above making prenatal screening services for the same
conditions available upon request.
The trivialization of abortion
In a study of public viewpoints, Farrimond and Kelly report
that ‘‘…fears about trivialisation are linked to the rejection
of ‘picking and choosing’ and a valuation of natural
diversity such as disability. As such, trivialisation fears are
not fears about having greater information per se, but are
rather the fear of the ‘trivialisation of abortion’ (de Jong
et al. 2010)’’ (2013, p. 740). Trivialization fears appear to
represent a general concern that screening for reproductive
choice may empower couples in using abortion for unim-
portant (i.e. not for avoiding suffering) or for discrimina-
tory reasons. Concerns have also been raised over the
additional harms that ‘trivial’ reproductive choices may
have in society, such as a loss of ‘natural’ diversity or a
perceived public endorsement of discriminatory views.
Such harms are primarily referenced in objections to
offering screening for non-medical traits (Hall et al. 2009;
Wright 2009). Although it would be preferable to avoid
these harms, it is difficult to understand why they might
only be problematic when screening is offered for non-
medical traits. For example, evidence indicates that some
women who engage in screening for the purpose of sex-
selection may do so in order to avoid suffering they
anticipate for themselves and/or their future child (Puri
et al. 2011; Raphael 2002; Wertz and Fletcher 1998). It
may therefore not be so apparent that a couple’s repro-
ductive choices where concerning non-medical traits are
always unimportant. Yet, if the main ethical concern is that
the offer of screening may falsely convey an endorsement
of discriminatory views, then it would be necessary to
explain why this might be unproblematic where concerning
conditions for which screening might still be offered (e.g.
Down syndrome).
A possible defense to this latter charge might be to argue
that the public only perceive such an ‘endorsement’ when
screening is offered for conditions that conflict with their
own norms and values relating to ‘important’ reproductive
choices. Within a recent attitudinal study on NIPT, Dutch
women suggested that they preferred the idea of offering
screening for ‘‘severe or fatal disorders that could lead to
the early death of a child or to a very low quality of life’’
(van Schendel et al. 2014, p. 1349). Van Schendel et al.
further report that ‘‘Participants also feared a so-called
‘slippery slope’, which could lead to people starting to test
for minor abnormalities, gender or for cosmetic traits like
blond hair and blue eyes.’’ (van Schendel et al. 2014,
p. 1348). If such views are indeed widely shared then it
could be argued that only where screening is offered for
non-medical traits would a discriminatory message be
conveyed. Yet, noting that discrimination which may only
be perceived by minority groups is discounted within such
an argument, additional inconsistencies are also apparent.
Although findings from attitudinal studies indicate that
screening for serious medical conditions is widely pre-
ferred, it is not clear that all participants are quite so
opposed to couples receiving greater levels of individual
choice. Van Schendel et al. states that ‘‘[the participants]
argued that even though it might be possible to determine
whether an unborn child has a severe disorder, a prenatal
test like NIPT cannot predict its severity or the quality of
life of the child. Moreover, participant’s stated that quality
of life is a relatively subjective concept and differs per
person, which all makes it very difficult to decide whether
to test and to continue with the pregnancy or not. Never-
theless, many participants felt that women should be able
to make their own decision about what to test for and what
not to test for’’ (van Schendel et al. 2014, p. 1349). A more
radical acceptance of individual choice is evidenced in a
study by Farrimond and Kelly who note that for a minority
of their participants ‘‘There is a clear prioritisation of
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parental choice about NIPD (67: ?5): ‘it should be the
parents’ decision what tests to have and what they want to
do with the results’ (P22, female, currently pregnant).’’
(Farrimond and Kelly 2013, p. 739). Farrimond and Kelly
go on to clarify that: ‘‘Furthermore, they agree with
expanding testing to include sex determination and testing
for non-medical conditions, both rejected in all other fac-
tors (4: ?6*; 7: -5): ‘‘it’s their choice to make’’ (P10,
female, two children).’’ (Farrimond and Kelly 2013,
p. 739). In view of these findings, it is less obvious that
social norms and values will conflict quite so strongly with
the full range of screening options that could be offered.
Perhaps a more reasonable objection to offering
screening for non-medical traits may be possible which
neither discounts any discrimination that may be perceived
by minority groups nor implies that a couple’s reproductive
choices are always trivial where concerning such condi-
tions. In view of reported findings from attitudinal research
in Western countries, it would seem that the majority of
couples would not wish to use prenatal screening where
concerning non-medical traits for the purpose of avoiding
the birth of an affected child (Faden et al. 1987; Harrington
et al. 1996; van Schendel et al. 2014). A much more rea-
sonable complaint may then be that routinely offering
screening for the purpose of reproductive choice where
concerning non-medical traits, may burden important
antenatal services that should be prioritized for couples
with greater need of them. The more prominent role of
personal, individually affecting, social determinants of
suffering for non-medical traits, means that couples are
unlikely to benefit from an unsolicited screening offer (and
the provision of associated services for educational support
and counseling) over and above making prenatal screening
available following personal enquiry. In this respect, a
more reasonable objection to routinely offering screening
for non-medical traits might be that this could ‘trivialize’
the provision of an important antenatal service and
undermine public solidarity towards providing couples
with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice.
Issues of distributive justice
The main issues of distributive justice discussed within the
bioethics literature relate to the question of whether or not
the use of scarce public resources for the provision of
prenatal screening is justifiable in view of public health
priorities. Debate of these issues is primarily polarized by
an ethical tension between conflicting moral imperatives
that both serve the aim of providing couples with oppor-
tunities for meaningful reproductive choice. Within the
bioethics literature there is broad consensus that a publicly
funded prenatal screening programme aimed at promoting
‘pure choice’ is unjustifiable (Clarke 1997; de Jong and de
Wert 2015; Munthe 2015; Wilkinson 2015). This is con-
tested for two principle reasons. The first relates to ethical
issues that have been discussed previously within this
paper: Offering pure choice could enable couples to make
trivial reproductive choices (the trivialization of abortion),
reproductive choices with that may harm future children
(the informational privacy of the future child), or result in
uninformed reproductive choices (information overload).
In view of these ethical issues, de Jong and de Wert argue
that prenatal screening should instead be aimed at ‘‘en-
abling individual pregnant women (and their partners) to
make meaningful reproductive choices with regard to
having or not having a child with a serious disorder or
disability.’’ (2015, p. 50). De Jong and de Wert clarify that
‘‘This can be seen as a combination of the second and third
candidate goals of prenatal screening as distinguished by
Clarke [1. Spare public resources; 2. Avoidance of suf-
fering; 3. Promotion of informed reproductive choices],
qualifying the latter (no ‘pure autonomy’) and adding to
the former that ‘avoidance of suffering’ need not only refer
to possible suffering of the future child, but may as well
refer to the impact of the birth of a child with a disorder or
handicap on the life of the woman, the couple, or the
family.’’ (2015, p. 50). Although this is currently the pre-
ferred normative framework in many Western countries
(HCN 2008), concerns have been raised that qualifying
choice to ‘serious disorders or disabilities’ will not ade-
quately reflect the heterogeneity of meaningful reproduc-
tive choices that couples may wish to make given the
opportunity (Dondorp et al. 2015; de Jong and de Wert
2015; Munthe 2015). This point is further emphasized
when considering some of the problems associated with
arguments supporting qualified choice that have been dis-
cussed previously within this paper. Screening may there-
fore incorporate a structural directivity that conflicts with
the objective of providing couples with informed and
autonomous reproductive choices that are meaningful to
them for avoiding suffering. This may be especially prob-
lematic within contexts where screening for conditions that
fall beyond the scope of publicly funded prenatal screening
programmes is also unavailable privately.
The second issue relates to the problem of offering pure
choice responsibly within a context of resource constraint.
The costs associated with offering pure choice within a
morally justifiable framework are thought to be prohibitive
and generally unjustifiable in view of opportunity costs
(e.g. funding the provision of care and support for people
affected by serious disorders or disabilities). Munthe sug-
gests that offering pure choice may only be ethically
responsible when health services ensure equal levels of
access and basic knowledge about services, require greater
initiative to be taken by couples in seeking and requesting
prenatal screening, and maintain adequate levels of non-
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directive pre- and post-test counseling (Munthe 2015).
Munthe points out that ‘‘It will be very expensive to
maintain the required adaptability of testing-kits and suf-
ficient standards of counselling. Mere promotion of
reproductive autonomy will hardly serve to justify such
costs in a public priority-setting context. Focusing on the
new PNT [Prenatal Testing] as a source of liberation and
self-determination thus rather drives a notion of it as a
reproductive information technology to be used by people
outside publicly funded services.’’ (2015, p. 43). However,
it has been noted that inequalities in opportunity for
meaningful reproductive choice are likely to develop if
access to prenatal screening is left to commercial providers
(de Jong and de Wert 2015; Munthe 2015; HCN 2008).
Such inequalities would seem especially problematic
where concerning more serious disorders and disabilities,
over which the majority of couples appear to be concerned
(Faden et al. 1987; Harrington et al. 1996; van Schendel
et al. 2014). When considering the strong preference
towards more serious medical conditions, the number of
couples that will need to access prenatal screening for
meaningful reproductive choice outside of a public funded
screening programme targeted at serious disorders and
disabilities is likely to be minimal.
Ethical debate on issues of distributive justice reveals
conflicting moral imperatives that both serve the goal of
providing couples with opportunities for meaningful
reproductive choice. On the one hand, prioritizing more
serious medical disorders may serve the majority’s needs
yet at the same time it may increase the structural direc-
tivity of any publicly funded prenatal screening service. On
the other hand, broadening the scope may lessen the
structural directivity of screening but may burden services
that facilitate couples in making meaningful reproductive
choices and expend scarce public resources that could be
used to tackle public health priorities (such as providing
care and support for families affected by serious disorders
or disabilities). Presently, there appears to be no ‘ideal’
criteria readily available that may be used to balance these
competing imperatives. Whilst prenatal screening is orga-
nized under the ethos of providing couples with opportu-
nities for meaningful reproductive choice, the structural
directivity associated with qualifying choice to include
only serious congenital and childhood disorders is likely to
remain a controversial practice. However, such ethical
tensions may be resolved if the offer of prenatal screening
is instead aimed at empowering couples with sufficient
capabilities for making meaningful reproductive choices.
Implied by this aim is that the scope of screening should
not be about promoting meaningful reproductive choices as
understood by the health service provider or general public,
but rather, should be about ensuring that couples are suf-
ficiently capable of anticipating (and avoiding) suffering
for themselves and/or their future child. Another (signifi-
cant) implication of this framework is that couples should
have the opportunity to make meaningful reproductive
choices about conditions that fall beyond the recommended
scope of serious congenital and childhood conditions.
Further ethical debate is necessary on how access to such
opportunities may be provided and whether there may be
pro tanto reasons for prohibiting it within certain social
contexts.
Concluding remarks
Whilst collectively, ethical challenges associated with the
informational privacy of the future child, information
overload, the trivialization of abortion, and issues of dis-
tributive justice may provide good reasons for qualifying
the scope of any routine prenatal screening offer to serious
congenital conditions and childhood disorders, they do not
represent coherent moral objections to providing couples
with the opportunity for making meaningful reproductive
choices about other conditions. If the use of public health
resources is justified for providing couples with opportu-
nities for meaningful reproductive choice through the offer
of prenatal screening, then public health services may have
obligations to similarly empower couples where concern-
ing conditions that fall beyond the scope of serious con-
genital conditions and childhood disorders. Ensuring that
couples have opportunities for making meaningful repro-
ductive choices about conditions for which prenatal
screening is not routinely offered may lessen ethical ten-
sions relating to the structural directivity of the offer. One
way in which this could be achieved would be to offer
couples the opportunity to screen for such conditions fol-
lowing some form of personal enquiry. Couples that
anticipate suffering for themselves and/or their future child
may then have the opportunity for making meaningful
reproductive choices. If such an approach were to be
adopted, it would seem advisable to develop strategies to
educate and counsel couples prior to conception in order to
ensure that couples have sufficient capabilities to anticipate
suffering for themselves and/or their future child. Inevi-
tably resource constraints, and limits set by the risk of
information overload, will require priority setting. Whilst
prenatal screening is offered for the purpose of providing
couples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive
choice, qualifying choice to serious congenital and child-
hood disorders is likely to remain a controversial practice.
Ethical tensions associated with the structural directivity of
qualified choice may however be resolved if prenatal
screening is instead aimed at empowering couples with
sufficient capabilities for making meaningful reproductive
choices. This alternative position appears more compatible
Qualifying choice: ethical reflection on the scope of prenatal screening
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with an ethos of non-directivity yet also justifies the
structural directivity of qualified choice.
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